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TYING NONCOMPETITIVE GOODS
Hebert Hovenkamp*
A tying arrangement can help a seller increase its profits by either controlling or exploiting pricing
irregularities in a secondary market.1 Such tying also benefits consumers by eliminating or reducing the
impact of double marginalization. Further, tying occasionally limits the substitution of “inefficient” inputs
for the tying product. While the double marginalization problem is common and serves to justify a wide
variety of ties, the input substitution problem is too rare and the effects are too ambiguous to determine
the general legal status of tie-ins. As a result, input substitution should be ignored as a ground to
condemn an otherwise lawful tie or to save an otherwise unlawful one except in the very rare case of clear
net effects.
Whether proof, generally or in specific cases, of incremental exploitation of preexisting power should
itself suffice to condemn tying is a controversial issue.2 Here, we ask how such exploitation—other than
through price discrimination3—can be aided by a tie, whether the exploitation exceeds that which would
occur without the tie, and whether any such incremental exploitation is accompanied by other anti- or
procompetitive features.

Double Marginalization and “Reverse Leveraging”
Consider the monopolist (or cartel) of one product that is used with a second, complementary product
that is monopolized by a different firm (or subject to a cartel of oligopoly). If the producers of these two
products are unable to coordinate their output the result is likely to be “double marginalization,” which
generally results in lower output and higher prices than if the first firm monopolized both products. For
example, some critics of a proposed divesture of Microsoft's Internet Explorer browser from its Windows
operating system5 argued that if the two products were sold by different firms, each having significant
market power, then the combined price of the two would be higher than if they were offered together by a
single firm.6
*

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
See generally ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL
INTEGRATION AND CONTROL (1983); FREDERICK R. WARREN-BOULTON, VERTICAL CONTROL OF
MARKETS (1978); Meyer Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 62 (1960).
2
See 9 ANTITRUST ¶ 1710.
3
See 9 ANTITRUST ¶ 1711.
5
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001). The government proposed this divestiture and
the district court accepted the proposal, but the remedy was vacated by the D.C. Circuit.
1

6

See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, ch. 2 (N.Y.: Oxford Press, 2011, forthcoming) (on
tying and double marginalization); Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, An Economist’s guide to U.S. v.
Microsoft, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (2001) (“[T]he sum of the operating system and application prices set
by an integrated monopolist will be lower than the sum of those prices when set separately by two
independent firms each with significant market power.”); Stan J. Liebowitz, An Expensive Pig in a Poke:
Estimating the Cost of the District Court’s Proposed Breakup of Microsoft, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 727
(2001); Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U.
PITT. L. REV. 453, 457 (2001); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and
Consumer Welfare, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 367 (2001); see also R. Venkatesh & W. Kamakura, Optimal
Bundling and Pricing under a Monopoly: Contrasting Complements and Substitutes from Independently
Valued Proudcts, 76 J. BUS. 211 (2003). Bundled discounts can lead to the same results – namely, the
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The double marginalization result occurs only when both products are sold at prices above the
competitive level. It can apply in both the vertical context, such as when a monopoly manufacturer must
distribute through a monopoly dealer, but also in situations involving complements, such as printers and
ink cartridges, or hospitals and physicians.4 Indeed, the problem is generally more serious in the
complementary situations, because often the offerors of complementary products are not in a good
position to negotiate with one another, while the participants in a vertical chain of distribution bargain
with each other all the time.1
Because power is required in both markets, double marginalization is unlikely to be of particular
concern if the tied product is a commodity such as dry ice or salt. However, it may produce potent
savings via tying if the tied product is subject to fixed costs or innovation or manufacturing economies of
scale that typically result in prices above short run costs. Double marginalization can occur both when
the proportions of sales in the two markets is fixed and when it is variable,2 so the consumer welfare
savings that result from elimination of double marginalization applies to both.

profit maximizing price of the bundle is lower than the profit maximizing prices of the goods when they
are sold separately. Likely examples are Southeast Missouri Hosp. v C.R. Bard, Inc., ___ F.2d ___, 2011
WL 2201067 (8th Cir. June 8, 2011); Cascade Health Solutions v. Peacehealth, 515 F.3d 973 (9th cir.
2008).
4

See 3B ANTITRUST ¶ 758, which develops the theory mainly in the vertical integration context. In
general, as each monopolist of a complement reduces output to its profit-maximizing level, market output
for the complementary package goes down further and prices rise further. See W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E.
HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 238–241 (4th ed.
2005); Blair & Kaserman, supra, 31-34; William F. Baxter & Daniel P. Kessler, Toward a Consistent
Theory of the Welfare Analysis of Agreements, 47 STAN. L. REV. 615, 625 (1995).
In the context of complementary products rather than vertical integration the phenomenon is
sometimes referred to as the “Cournot complements” problem because it is derived from Cournot’s
analysis of pricing by firms that produce complements rather than substitutes. See AUGUSTIN A.
COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH 99–116
(Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Macmillan 1897) (1897); see also Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on
Foreclosure, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ch. 33 (Mark Armstrong & Robert H.
Porter, eds., 2007); Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, Substituting Complements, 2 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 333 (2006); Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, The Market for Intellectual
Property: The Case of Complementary Oligopoly, in THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS
IN RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 162 (Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watts eds., 2003); James M. Buchanan
& Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2000); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST
BULL. 613 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592476.
1

The problem is particularly prevalent in high technology markets where the degree of interaction
between products is significant and compatibility concerns limit the range of complementary choices. See
BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT, supra, ch. 1.
2

For example, if a monopoly gasoline refiner is selling to gasoline stations that have formed a cartel
and are extracting a high markup the refiner can eliminate the markup and benefit both itself and
consumers, even though different members of the cartel sell different amounts of gasoline. See James L.
Hamilton & Ibrahim Mqasqas, Double Marginalization and Vertical Integration: New Lessons from
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To illustrate, suppose that most authors prefer to have both a dictionary and a thesaurus, and both
are sold in imperfectly competitive markets, such as an oligopoly. A dictionary costs $10 to make, a
thesaurus costs $8 to make, and the profit-maximizing price of a bundle is $20. Different firms selling the
two products would each try to capture the overcharge. For example, the dictionary maker might charge
$12 on the theory that the thesaurus maker would charge $8. But the thesaurus maker would charge $10
on the assumption that the dictionary maker would charge $10 as well. That outcome, which would yield
a package price of $22, is suboptimal for everyone.3 Fewer consumers would buy and those that did
would pay too much. Output for both the dictionary maker and the thesaurus maker would fall below the
“joint-maximizing” level. In this case consumer welfare would increase if a single firm sold both the
dictionary and the thesaurus for a package price of $20, which would also be that firm’s profit
maximizing level. The firm could either package the two together at a price of $20, or it could sell each
separately at prices of $12 and $10, respectively, but also bundle them at a discounted price of $20.4
When a monopolist or oligopolist in one market contemplates the effects of a price cut, it
calculates the decreased revenue from the lower price against the increased net revenue from a higher
number of sales. For instance, the dictionary maker in the above example might charge $12, and calculate
that a $2 price cut would yield 1000 additional dictionary sales. However, if the dictionary maker
operated in both markets and tied the dictionary to the thesaurus, complementary products both sold at
above cost, then a $2 price cut might yield 1000 additional dictionary sales plus 1000 additional thesaurus
sales. That is to say, the profit maximizing price would be lower when a single firm controlled both
products and could tie them together. This result could also come about if the sellers of the two products
were separate but were able to coordinate their behavior. They would jointly maximize by sharing both
the output increase and the price reduction, as in the vertical integration context. Note, however, that the
gains accrue only by tying. The seller does not profit simply because he makes both dictionaries and
thesauruses, but rather because the output increase in dictionaries attaches to thesauruses as well.
A rule condemning tying in this situation would reduce both producer and consumers’ surplus
unless the court also forced the firms to charge less than their individual profit-maximizing prices. One
might assume that the dictionary maker could charge $12 for the dictionary and separately sell the
thesaurus at the marginal cost price of $8. But that result would be no better than bundling, and the seller
could not be expected to do it, because some buyers would purchase its thesaurus at the competitive price
and then go elsewhere for their $12 dictionary. That is to say, the lower price on the thesaurus is
profitable only on the premise that the seller is obtaining the dictionary sell as well, and vice-versa.
This result very likely explains many bundled discounts that occur in markets where the rival is
operating in an oligopoly market and enjoying fairly high markups—a common characteristic of even
modestly concentrated American markets.5 The firm making the two products sells them individually at

Extensions of the Classic Case, 62 S. ECON. J. 567, 581–84 (1996); Michael Waterson, Vertical
Integration, Variable Proportions and Oligopoly, 92 ECON. J. 129 (1982).
3

For useful graphical and mathematical elaborations, see Parisi & Depoorter, supra note __.
See Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950);
Bruce H. Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating Commodity Bundling by
Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature, 1 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 707 (2005).
4

5

See Robert E. Hall, The Relation Between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry, 96 J. POL.
ECON. 921 (1988).
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the single-product oligopoly price, but bundles them at a profit maximizing price that is lower than the
sum of the individual profit maximizing prices when offered by different firms.6
Or consider a hypothetical situation resembling the one in Jefferson Parish, where the Supreme
Court approved a hospital-anesthesiologist tie.7 Suppose a dominant hospital required surgical services
from anesthesiologists, a complementary product that was locally sold under conditions of oligopoly.
Absent coordination both the hospital and the anesthesiologists would charge too high a price, the output
of surgery would accordingly be reduced and consumers harmed. The hospital could negotiate a lower
rate for anesthesiology services, however, if it promised a particular anesthesiologist to use its services
exclusively. Output would then rise to the “single monopoly” level, prices would fall, and the hospital,
the anesthesiologist and its patients would all benefit. This would be an instance of “reverse” leveraging,
where tying caused a lower rather than higher price.
Results similar to this are reasonably likely whenever both the tying and tied markets are subject
to pricing above the competitive level and sufficient coordination between producers of the two products
is unlikely—although even coordination would very likely take the form of tying.8 The markets need not
be monopolized. As a result, the savings from elimination of double marginalization can apply to almost
any market in which the tied product is not a commodity sold at the competitive price. In such markets the
profit maximizing price of the tying monopolist is actually lower than that of two firms independently
selling the tying and tied products.9
Ties that at first glance appear to be accompanied by price increases in the tying product can also
be used to control double marginalization, although such arrangements appear to be far less common.
Such ties are in fact two part tariffs, in which the seller charges a fixed price for one component and then
sells a linked component at a competitive price. For example, suppose a firm has significant market
power in its fuel efficient car, which is best distributed by independent dealers, many of which have
power in their local markets. If the seller charges its monopoly price to the dealers they will assess a
second markup to their customers, producing double marginalization, reduced output, and higher prices.
Suppose, however, that the manufacturer builds the monopoly upcharge into a fixed franchise fee and
then sells the cars to the dealers at the competitive price. In this case the dealer will still take its markup,
but that will reflect only its own power and not that of the manufacturer. Further, because the franchise
fee is a fixed cost to the dealer, the dealer can earn more by increasing the volume of cars sold in the time
period covered by the fee.10 The term “tying” is apt because the manufacturer will not sell the cars at this
6

See, e.g., Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., L.P., No. CV 02-4770 MRP, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26916, at *27 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2004) (plaintiff challenging defendant’s discount practices which
included bundled discounts had profit margins of between 45% and 83% during the period of claimed
exclusion). The Ninth Circuit eventually entered an order finding liability on some claims but not others.
Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., L.P., 350 Fed. Appx. 95, 2009 WL 3451725 (9th Cir. Oct. 28,
2009).
7

8

Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).

For example, a dictionary maker and a thesaurus maker could sell packages jointly, agreeing on how
to divide the surplus.
9
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis,
55 ANTITRUST BULL. 613 (2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592476; Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Competitive Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443284.
10
See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 174–176 (1988), who notes that
the theory is very general. See also David Gilo, Retail Competition Percolating Through to Suppliers and
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price to those who have not paid the fee. That is to say, the competitively priced cars are the tying
product while the franchise fee is the tied product, which is the reverse of the usual claim in the franchise
context. The impact of tying in this case is higher output and lower car prices than would occur if the
manufacturer simply sold the cars at wholesale at its profit-maximizing price.
While the theory of double marginalization is generally thought to be robust, actual output effects
in particular cases are generally impossible to measure. As a general proposition, however, the theory
shows that “linking” two monopolized markets by tying typically does not result in increased consumer or
economic harm. Indeed, it is much more likely to be beneficial. Given the present state of analysis, we
would not favor elimination of double marginalization as a defense to a tie that is objectionable on other
grounds unless there is specific evidence that the tie results in greater output and that its results could not
be duplicated in some less objectionable manner.

Limiting Substitution of Inefficient Inputs
Substitutes, including imperfect ones, limit the ability of a defendant to restrict output and to exploit
customers. As it raises price above the competitive level, even the sole supplier of an important product
will induce some users to shift to the substitute; at some point, additional price increases would sacrifice
profits rather than increase them. Thus, such shifts, even to an inferior substitute, limit the detrimental
price-output effects of the defendant's monopoly. At the same time, however, such shifts waste society's
resources by increasing the production of goods that might not be produced at all when competitive prices
prevail.
Some ties can prevent these shifts and thus harmfully remove a constraint on monopoly pricing or
beneficially eliminate a wasteful misallocation of resources. Unable to know whether society generally
suffers or benefits from ties limiting input substitution, this function does not support general illegality or
legality for tying. Because the net balance between these harmful and beneficial tendencies is not likely to
be resolved confidently in particular cases, limiting input substitution should presumptively be ignored as
a reason to condemn a tie that is otherwise lawful or to save one that is otherwise unlawful.
To illustrate, suppose that in a competitive market a certain type of glue is made up of 50 percent D, a
drying agent, and 50 percent B, a bonding agent. Different proportions work somewhat less well, and in a
competitive market B costs more than D, so the glue makers optimize with the 50-50 mix. But now
suppose that D is monopolized, and the price is doubled. As a result, the glue makers would now prefer to
make a glue that consists of 70 percent B and 30 percent D. This mix (1) would not be the consumers' first
choice in a competitive market; and (2) represents an inefficient allocation of resources in that it does not
reflect the relative demand for these two products in a competitive market.
At the same time, the altered mix reduces the demand for D, reducing the D monopolist's profits. That
firm might then respond by (1) pre-mixing B and D in the original 50-50 mix and selling it only in that
form—a form of “technological tie;”9 or (2) refusing to sell D unless buyers agreed to take all of their B

the Use of Vertical Integration, Tying and Vertical Restraints to Stop it, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 25, 54
(2003) (use of tying to limit double marginalization); Sreya Kolay & Greg Shaffer, Bundlng and Menus of
Two-Part Tariffs, 51 J. IND. ECON. 383 (2003) (comparing bundling and two part tariffs). Microsoft uses
such a strategy to keep computer makers from assessing too high a markup on its Windows operating
system. See Michael P. Akemann, Microsoft’s Licensing Agreements: Theory and Evidence on the Sale
of MS-DOS and Windows, 24 J. CORP. L. 553, 561 (1999).
9
See 10 ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1757. A technological tie occurs when the tying vehicle is not a contract
but rather a manufacturer-produced physical combination of the two products. For example, a computer
manufacturer wishing to tie its hardware to its software could either (1) use a contract to require each
purchaser of one of its computers to buy a specified set of its programs; or (2) pre-load the software on
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requirements from the seller as well at a monopoly price designed to restore the attractiveness of the 5050 mix.10
The two practices just described have the harmful effect of forcing buyers to take the full 50 percent
of the monopolized drying agent, thus expanding the sales of the monopolized product; but they also have
the socially beneficial effect of restoring the product mix to that which it would be when both B and D
were sold competitively.11
But known instances of tying for this purpose are extremely rare. Further, determining whether the
offsetting economic effects are on balance a gain or a loss requires precise knowledge of the demand
curves facing both products and the effects of substitution on the demand for other products. No
procedure for assessing net welfare effects is within the competence of the antitrust tribunal. This
rationale thus serves neither to condemn ties that are otherwise lawful nor to save those that are otherwise
unlawful, except perhaps in a very rare case in which the net effects are very clear.

the computers' hard drives, set a package price, and refuse to sell computers without the pre-installed
package.
10
This would actually be a combination of tying and exclusive dealing.
11
For the relevant mathematics and diagrams, see ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW
AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL (1983).

